A game-theoretic investigation of selection methods in two-population coevolution

  • Authors:
  • Sevan G. Ficici

  • Affiliations:
  • Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 8th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

We examine the dynamical and game-theoretic properties of several selection methods in the context of two-population coevolution. The methods we examine are fitness-proportional, linear rank, truncation, and (μ,λ)-ES selection. We use simple symmetric variable-sum games in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework. Our results indicate that linear rank, truncation, and (μ,λ)-ES selection are somewhat better-behaved in a two-population setting than in the one-population case analyzed by Ficici et al. [4]. These alternative selection methods maintain the Nash-equilibrium attractors found in proportional selection, but also add non-Nash attractors as well as regions of phase-space that lead to cyclic dynamics. Thus, these alternative selection methods do not properly implement the Nash-equilibrium solution concept.