Making Rational Decisions Using Adaptive Utility Elicitation
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
CIA '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents IV, The Future of Information Agents in Cyberspace
Preference elicitation via theory refinement
The Journal of Machine Learning Research
An agenda-based framework for multi-issue negotiation
Artificial Intelligence
Optimal Negotiation of Multiple Issues in Incomplete Information Settings
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Learning on opponent's preferences to make effective multi-issue negotiation trade-offs
ICEC '04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Electronic commerce
Learning opponents' preferences in multi-object automated negotiation
ICEC '05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Electronic commerce
Regret-based utility elicitation in constraint-based decision problems
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Assimilating ontological additions in convergent negotiation protocols
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Predicting user preferences via similarity-based clustering
Canadian AI'08 Proceedings of the Canadian Society for computational studies of intelligence, 21st conference on Advances in artificial intelligence
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An agent engaged in multi-issue automated negotiation can benefit greatly from learning about its opponent's preferences. Knowledge of the opponent's preferences can help the agent not only to find mutually acceptable agreements more quickly, but also to negotiate deals that are better for the agent in question. In this paper, we describe a new technique for learning about an opponent's preferences by observing its history of offers in a negotiation. Patterns in the similarity between the opponent's offers and our own agent's offers are used to determine the likelihood that the opponent is making a concession at each stage in the negotiation. These probabilities of concession are then used to determine the opponent's most likely preference relation over all offers. Experimental results show that our technique significantly outperforms a previous method that assumes that a negotiation agent will always make concessions during the course of a negotiation.