STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Efficient Oblivious Proofs of Correct Exponentiation
CMS '99 Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/TC11 Joint Working Conference on Secure Information Networks: Communications and Multimedia Security
Fault tolerant anonymous channel
ICICS '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Information and Communication Security
Email as spectroscopy: automated discovery of community structure within organizations
Communities and technologies
Reusable anonymous return channels
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Privacy-Preserving graph algorithms in the semi-honest model
ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Towards identity anonymization on graphs
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
Privacy-Aware Collaborative Access Control in Web-Based Social Networks
Proceeedings of the 22nd annual IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and Applications Security
Resisting structural re-identification in anonymized social networks
Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment
FlyByNight: mitigating the privacy risks of social networking
Proceedings of the 7th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Privacy-preserving social network analysis for criminal investigations
Proceedings of the 7th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
A brief survey on anonymization techniques for privacy preserving publishing of social network data
ACM SIGKDD Explorations Newsletter
Key allocation schemes for private social networks
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
k-automorphism: a general framework for privacy preserving network publication
Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment
Practical privacy-preserving protocols for criminal investigations
ISI'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Intelligence and security informatics
Resisting structural re-identification in anonymized social networks
The VLDB Journal — The International Journal on Very Large Data Bases
The Anonymous Subgraph Problem
Computers and Operations Research
Data-oblivious graph algorithms for secure computation and outsourcing
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information, computer and communications security
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Connections in distributed systems, such as social networks, online communities or peer-to-peer networks, form complex graphs. These graphs are of interest to scientists in fields as varied as marketing, epidemiology and psychology. However, knowledge of the graph is typically distributed among a large number of subjects, each of whom knows only a small piece of the graph. Efforts to assemble these pieces often fail because of privacy concerns: subjects refuse to share their local knowledge of the graph. To assuage these privacy concerns, we propose reconstructing the whole graph privately, i.e., in a way that hides the correspondence between the nodes and edges in the graph and the real-life entities and relationships that they represent. We first model the privacy threats posed by the private reconstruction of a distributed graph. Our model takes into account the possibility that malicious nodes may report incorrect information about the graph in order to facilitate later attempts to de-anonymize the reconstructed graph. We then propose protocols to privately assemble the pieces of a graph in ways that mitigate these threats. These protocols severely restrict the ability of adversaries to compromise the privacy of honest subjects.