Communications of the ACM
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Fault tolerant anonymous channel
ICICS '97 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Information and Communication Security
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Receiver anonymity via incomparable public keys
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure distributed key generation for discrete-log based cryptosystems
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
The pynchon gate: a secure method of pseudonymous mail retrieval
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Private social network analysis: how to assemble pieces of a graph privately
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Kleptographic attacks on a cascade of mix servers
ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
ACNS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Deterring voluntary trace disclosure in re-encryption mix-networks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Auditable privacy: on tamper-evident mix networks
FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Efficient correlated action selection
FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Privacy-preserving smart metering with regional statistics and personal enquiry services
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information, computer and communications security
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Mix networks are used to deliver messages anonymously to recipients, but do not straightforwardly allow the recipient of an anonymous message to reply to its sender. Yet the ability to reply one or more times, and to further reply to replies, is essential to a complete anonymous conversation. We propose a protocol that allows a sender of anonymous messages to establish a reusable anonymous return channel. This channel enables any recipient of one of these anonymous messages to send back one or more anonymous replies. Recipients who reply to different messages can not test whether two return channels are the same, and there-fore can not learn whether they are replying to the same person. Yet the fact that multiple recipients may send multiple replies through the same return channel helps defend against the counting attacks that defeated earlier proposals for return channels. In these attacks, an adversary traces the origin of a message by sending a specific number of replies and observing who collects the same number of messages. Our scheme resists these attacks because the replies sent by an attacker are mixed with other replies submitted by other recipients through the same return channel. Moreover, our protocol straightforwardly allows for replies to replies, etc. Our protocol is based upon a re-encryption mix network, and requires four times the amount of computation and communication of a basic mixnet.