A price-based reliable routing game in wireless networks

  • Authors:
  • Hua Liu;Bhaskar Krishnamachari

  • Affiliations:
  • University Of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA;University Of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA

  • Venue:
  • GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

We investigate a price-based reliable routing game in a wireless network of selfish users. Each node is characterized by a probability of reliably forwarding a packet, and each link is characterized by a cost of transmission. The objective is to form a stable and reliable routing path between a given source and destination pair. The pricing mechanism involved in this routing game is destination-driven and source-mediated: for each successfully delivered packet, the destination node pays the source, which in turn compensates all nodes that participate in routing the packet. We develop a polynomial-time algorithm for deriving an efficient Nash equilibrium routing path. We also present simulations to evaluate the reliability of the obtained path with respect to prices and source-destination cooperation for different network settings.