A comparative axiomatic characterization of the Banzhaf-Owen coalitional value

Authors:
J. M. Alonso-Meijide;F. Carreras;M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro;G. Owen
Affiliations:
Department of Statistics and Operations Research and Faculty of Sciences of Lugo, University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain;Department of Applied Mathematics II and School of Industrial and Aeronautic Engineering of Terrassa, Technical University of Catalonia, Spain;Department of Statistics and Operations Research and Faculty of Economics, University of Vigo, Spain;Department of Mathematics, Naval Postgraduate School of Monterey, California, United States
Venue:
Decision Support Systems
Year:
2007

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Abstract

A compact axiomatic characterization of the modified Banzhaf value for games with a coalition structure (Banzhaf-Owen value, for short) is provided. The axiomatic system used here can be compared with parallel axiomatizations of other coalitional values such as the Owen value or the Alonso-Fiestras value, thus giving arguments to defend the use of one of them that will depend on the context where they are to be applied.