Voting games with abstention: Linking completeness and weightedness

Authors:
Josep Freixas;Bertrand Tchantcho;Narcisse Tedjeugang
Affiliations:
"Departament de Matemítica Aplicada 3 i Escola Politècnica Superior d'Enginyeria de Manresa (Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya)", Spain;University of Yaounde I, MASS laboratory, Cameroon and University of Cergy Pontoise, THEMA Laboratory, France;University of Yaounde I, Cameroon
Venue:
Decision Support Systems
Year:
2014

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Abstract

Weighted games for several levels of approval in input and output were introduced in [9]. An extension of the desirability relation for simple games, called the influence relation, was introduced for games with several levels of approval in input in [24] (see also [18]). However, there are weighted games not being complete for the influence relation, something different to what occurs for simple games. In this paper we introduce several extensions of the desirability relation for simple games and from the completeness of them it follows the consistent link with weighted games, which solves the existing gap. Moreover, we prove that the influence relation is consistent with a known subclass of weighted games: strongly weighted games.