Responding to Bioterrorist Smallpox in San Antonio

  • Authors:
  • George Miller;Stephen Randolph;Jan E. Patterson

  • Affiliations:
  • Altarum Institute, PO Box 134001, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48113-4001;Altarum Institute, 3737 Broadway, Suite 205, San Antonio, Texas 78209;University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio and South Texas Veterans Health Care System, 7400 Merton Minter Street, San Antonio, Texas 78229

  • Venue:
  • Interfaces
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

We used discrete-event simulation to help the San Antonio public health and acute medical care communities to plan their response to a bioterrorist attack. The analysis, based on a scenario positing an attack with aerosolized smallpox, indicated the resources and strategies needed for an effective response. We found that a mixture of public-health measures designed to stop the spread of the disease would form a more robust and effective response than any single measure. However, unless the attack is very small, the public-health system is unlikely to be able to prevent a surge in demand for acute care that will require community-wide coordination of resources, a definitive patient-triage policy, and temporary treatment practices. The San Antonio communities are integrating our recommendations into their plans.