Multiclass queueing systems: polymatroidal structure and optimal scheduling control
Operations Research - Supplement to Operations Research: stochastic processes
Modeling the transplant waiting list: A queueing model with reneging
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
Dynamic Allocation of Kidneys to Candidates on the Transplant Waiting List
Operations Research
Patient Choice in Kidney Allocation: The Role of the Queueing Discipline
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Patient Choice in Kidney Allocation: A Sequential Stochastic Assignment Model
Operations Research
A queuing model of time waiting based on kidney transplantation
CCDC'09 Proceedings of the 21st annual international conference on Chinese Control and Decision Conference
A Broader View of Designing the Liver Allocation System
Operations Research
Performance-Based Contracts for Outpatient Medical Services
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
On the Efficiency-Fairness Trade-off
Management Science
An Overloaded Multiclass FIFO Queue with Abandonments
Operations Research
Incentive-Compatible Revenue Management in Queueing Systems: Optimal Strategic Delay
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
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In kidney allocation, transplant candidates may have private information about their propensity to enjoy good outcomes after transplantation or about their relative expected improvement in quality of life after transplantation. This paper develops a mechanism design model to investigate the effect of such information asymmetry on the kidney allocation system. In this model, there are n transplant queues corresponding to n candidate types. Candidate types are only observed by the candidates, and each candidate chooses the queue to join by reporting a type. Kidneys have heterogeneous types, and each kidney will be assigned to one of the queues depending on its type. Candidates report their type strategically to join the queue that maximizes their utility. Candidate utility depends on the type of kidney received and the expected waiting time, which is calculated using fluid approximations. We consider two alternative social welfare functions: aggregate utility (emphasizing efficiency) and minimum utility across all candidates (emphasizing equity). The kidney allocation problem is to divide the organ supply among the different queues so that social welfare is maximized, and this problem is solved explicitly under both objective functions. There are three findings: (1) The allocation mechanism induces truth telling by ensuring that candidates who wait longer receive better kidneys; (2) Information rents are earned by high-risk candidates under the efficiency objective and by low-risk candidates under the equity objective; (3) a choice-based kidney allocation system in which candidates choose the type of queue to join leads to outcomes in the middle of the efficiency-equity spectrum.