On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue: 31st IEEE conference on foundations of computer science, Oct. 22–24, 1990
On the complexity of equilibria
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The WALRAS Algorithm: A Convergent Distributed Implementation of General Equilibrium Outcomes
Computational Economics
Market Equilibrium via a Primal-Dual-Type Algorithm
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Computing the Arrow-Debreu Market Equilibrium for Linear Utilities
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The computation of market equilibria
ACM SIGACT News
A Fast and Simple Algorithm for Computing Market Equilibria
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
The Complexity of Models of International Trade
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Market equilibrium using auctions for a class of gross-substitute utilities
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Distributed algorithms via gradient descent for fisher markets
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Buy-sell auction mechanisms in market equilibrium
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
A Simple Approximation Algorithm for Computing Arrow-Debreu Prices
Operations Research
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In this paper we study algorithms for computing market equilibrium in markets with linear utility functions. The buyers in the market have an initial endowment given by a portfolio of goods. The market equilibrium problem is to compute a price vector that ensures market clearing, i.e., the demand of a positively priced good equals its supply, and given the prices, each buyer maximizes its utility. The problem is of considerable interest in economics. This paper presents a formulation of the market equilibrium problem as a parameterized linear program. We construct a family of duals corrresponding to these parameterized linear programs and show that finding the market equilibrium is the same as finding a linear program from this family of linear programs. The market-clearing conditions arise naturally from complementary slackness conditions. We then define an auction mechanism that computes prices such that approximate market clearing is achieved. The algorithm we obtain outperforms previously known methods.