A randomized protocol for signing contracts
Communications of the ACM
Non-repudiation with mandatory proof of receipt
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
JCCM: Flexible Certificates for Smartcards with Java Card
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
An Optimistic Non-repudiation Protocol with Transparent Trusted Third Party
ISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Security
An Efficient Non-repudiation Protocol
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Constructing fair-exchange protocols for E-commerce via distributed computation of RSA signatures
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A fair non-repudiation protocol
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Certificate revocation system implementation based on the Merkle hash tree
International Journal of Information Security
An abuse-free fair contract signing protocol based on the RSA signature
WWW '05 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on World Wide Web
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
A fair protocol for signing contracts
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
An intensive survey of fair non-repudiation protocols
Computer Communications
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Non-repudiation protocols are of great importance for electronic interactions. Different protocols have been proposed in this field, progressively relaxing the requirements on the computing power of both parties, and on the load and involvement of a trusted third party (TTP). Besides, there is a need to provide mobile users with a protocol adequate for ad hoc scenarios, where only unreliable channels can be guaranteed, and where the CA may not be reachable. In this paper we propose a new version of the fair non-repudiation protocol proposed by Gurgens et al. in [Sigrid Gurgens, Carsten Rudolph, Holger Vogt, On the security of fair non-repudiation protocols, in: Colin Boyd, Wenbo Mao (Eds.), ISC, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2851, Springer, 2003, pp. 193-207]. We show unfair scenarios that can appear if one party controls the communication among the TTP and the other party. We introduce notary agents, which play the TTP role, and run our fair non-repudiation protocol. Notary agents execute inside the smart card, and sign the protocol messages with the user's private key on his behalf. Our approach enables the protocol to run on unreliable channels, disconnected from the CA.