A Two-Sided Optimization for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense

Authors:
Gerald Brown;Matthew Carlyle;Douglas Diehl;Jeffrey Kline;Kevin Wood
Affiliations:
Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943;Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943;Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943;Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943;Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
Venue:
Operations Research
Year:
2005

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Abstract

We describe JOINT DEFENDER, a new two-sided optimization model for planning the pre-positioning of defensive missile interceptors to counter an attack threat. In our basic model, a defender pre-positions ballistic missile defense platforms to minimize the worst-case damage an attacker can achieve; we assume that the attacker will be aware of defensive pre-positioning decisions, and that both sides have complete information as to target values, attacking-missile launch sites, weapon system capabilities, etc. Other model variants investigate the value of secrecy by restricting the attacker's and/or defender's access to information. For a realistic scenario, we can evaluate a completely transparent exchange in a few minutes on a laptop computer, and can plan near-optimal secret defenses in seconds. JOINT DEFENDER's mathematical foundation and its computational efficiency complement current missile-defense planning tools that use heuristics or supercomputing. The model can also provide unique insight into the value of secrecy and deception to either side. We demonstrate with two hypothetical North Korean scenarios.