Slot Trading Opportunities in Collaborative Ground Delay Programs

Authors:
Thomas W. M. Vossen;Michael O. Ball
Affiliations:
Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0419;Robert H. Smith School of Business and Institute for Systems Research, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742-1815
Venue:
Transportation Science
Year:
2006

Citing 4
Cited 4

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Ground Delay Program Planning Under Uncertainty Based on the Ration-by-Distance Principle

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Integrating Slot Exchange, Safety, Capacity, and Equity Mechanisms Within an Airspace Flow Program

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Resource management in the air traffic domain

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Abstract

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the major airlines in the United States have embraced a new initiative to improve air traffic flow management. This initiative, called collaborative decision making (CDM), is based on the recognition that improved data exchange and communication between the FAA and the airlines will lead to better decision making. In particular, the CDM philosophy emphasizes that decisions with a potential economic impact on airlines should be decentralized and made in collaboration with the airlines whenever possible. The CDM paradigm has led to fundamental changes in the implementation of ground delay programs. A key component has been the introduction of the compression procedure, which allows for the exchange of arrival slots between airlines. In this paper, we consider opportunities for increased airline control by interpreting the compression procedure as a mediated slot trading mechanism. Based on this interpretation, we propose an extension that allows airlines to submit so-called at-least, at-most offers. We develop an efficient integer programming model to solve the mediators problem, and show that the resulting mechanism can substantially improve the ability of airlines to optimize their internal cost functions.