Practical network support for IP traceback
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
An algebraic approach to IP traceback
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Controlling high bandwidth aggregates in the network
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Efficient packet marking for large-scale IP traceback
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Sustaining Availability of Web Services under Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
ICNP '02 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Pi: A Path Identification Mechanism to Defend against DDoS Attacks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Hop-count filtering: an effective defense against spoofed DDoS traffic
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Alliance formation for DDoS defense
Proceedings of the 2003 workshop on New security paradigms
DDoS attacks and defense mechanisms: classification and state-of-the-art
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
A taxonomy of DDoS attack and DDoS defense mechanisms
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Mitigating bandwidth-exhaustion attacks using congestion puzzles
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Perimeter-Based Defense against High Bandwidth DDoS Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
You Can Run, But You Can't Hide: An Effective Statistical Methodology to Trace Back DDoS Attackers
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
A DoS-limiting network architecture
Proceedings of the 2005 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Centertrack: an IP overlay network for tracking DoS floods
SSYM'00 Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 9
Guaranteeing access in spite of distributed service-flooding attacks
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Security Protocols
Defending against flooding-based distributed denial-of-service attacks: a tutorial
IEEE Communications Magazine
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Transport-aware IP routers: a built-in protection mechanism to counter DDoS attacks
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Review: Analyzing well-known countermeasures against distributed denial of service attacks
Computer Communications
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Attack mitigation schemes actively throttle attack traffic generated in Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. This paper presents Attack Diagnosis (AD), a novel attack mitigation scheme that adopts a divide-and-conquer strategy. AD combines the concepts of Pushback and packet marking, and its architecture is in line with the ideal DDoS attack countermeasure paradigm—attack detection is performed near the victim host and packet filtering is executed close to the attack sources. AD is a reactive defense mechanism that is activated by a victim host after an attack is detected. By instructing its upstream routers to mark packets deterministically, the victim can trace back one attack source and command an AD-enabled router close to the source to filter the attack packets. This process isolates one attacker and throttles it, which is repeated until the attack is mitigated. We also propose an extension to AD called Parallel Attack Diagnosis (PAD) that is capable of throttling traffic coming from a large number of attackers simultaneously. AD and PAD are analyzed and evaluated using the Skitter Internet map, Lumeta's Internet map, and the 6-degree complete tree topology model. Both schemes are shown to be robust against IP spoofing and to incur low false positive ratios.