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Currently, there is no effective defense against large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. While numerous DDoS defense systems exist that offer excellent protection from specific attack types and scenarios, they can frequently be defeated by an attacker aware of their weaknesses. A necessary requirement for successful DDoS defense is wide deployment, but none of these systems can guarantee wide deployment simply because deployment depends more on market and social aspects than on the technical performance of the system.To successfully handle the DDoS threat we must abandon the current paradigm---the design of defense systems that operate in isolation---and shift toward a new paradigm, a distributed framework of heterogeneous systems that cooperate to achieve an effective defense. Heterogeneity is dictated by two major factors. First, the necessary requirements for a successful defense are detection, response and traffic differentiation. These requirements must be met at disjoint points in the Internet and require a disjoint set of functionalities from the defense systems. Second, heterogeneity is dictated by the current state of the DDoS defense field in which numerous systems exist that can offer similar performance and compete for market share. In this paper we show how the paradigm shift can be accomplished quickly and painlessly through the design of DefCOM, a distributed framework that enables the exchange of information and services between existing defense nodes.