Prisoner's Dilemma: John Von Neumann, Game Theory and the Puzzle of the Bomb
Prisoner's Dilemma: John Von Neumann, Game Theory and the Puzzle of the Bomb
A multi-level approach and infrastructure for agent-oriented software development
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Alliance formation for DDoS defense
Proceedings of the 2003 workshop on New security paradigms
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A Policy Driven Approach to Email Services
POLICY '04 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks
Collision Module Integration in a Specific Graphic Engine for Terrain Visualization
IV '04 Proceedings of the Information Visualisation, Eighth International Conference
An empirical study of spam traffic and the use of DNS black lists
Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Socio-technical defense against voice spamming
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS)
TRAP: open decentralized distributed spam filtering
TrustBus'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Trust, privacy and security in digital business
A survey of emerging approaches to spam filtering
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Establishing trust between mail servers to improve spam filtering
ATC'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing
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Current anti-spam tools focus on filtering incoming e-mails. The scope of these tools is limited to local administrative domains. With such limited information, it is difficult to make accurate spam control decisions. We observe that sending servers process more information on their outgoing e-mail traffic than receiving servers do on their incoming traffic. Better spam control can be achieved if e-mail servers collaborate with one another by checking both outgoing and incoming traffic. However, the control of outgoing traffic provides little direct benefit to the sending server. Servers in different administrative domains presently have little incentive to improve spam control on other receiving servers, which hampers a move toward cross-domain collaboration. We propose a collaborative framework in which spam control decisions are drawn from the data aggregated within a group of e-mail servers across different administrative domains. The collaboration provides incentive for outgoing spam control. The servers that contribute to the control of outgoing spam are rewarded, while traffic restriction is imposed on the irresponsible servers. A Federated Security Context (FSC) is established to enable transparent negotiation of multilateral decisions among the group of collaborators without common trust. Information from trusted collaborators counts more for one's final decision compared to information from untrustworthy servers. The FSC mitigates potential threats of fake information from malicious servers. The collaborative approach to spam control is more efficient than a decision in isolation, providing dynamic identification and adaptive restriction to spam generators.