Truth in advertising: lightweight verification of route integrity
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Path-quality monitoring in the presence of adversaries
SIGMETRICS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Rationality and traffic attraction: incentives for honest path announcements in bgp
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
Packet-dropping adversary identification for data plane security
CoNEXT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference
Cabernet: connectivity architecture for better network services
CoNEXT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference
Accountability in hosted virtual networks
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Virtualized infrastructure systems and architectures
Detecting traffic differentiation in backbone ISPs with NetPolice
Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference
MMS: an autonomic network-layer foundation for network management
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
From optimization to regret minimization and back again
SysML'08 Proceedings of the Third conference on Tackling computer systems problems with machine learning techniques
Network architecture for joint failure recovery and traffic engineering
Proceedings of the ACM SIGMETRICS joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
NetQuery: a knowledge plane for reasoning about network properties
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011 conference
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IP routing is notoriously vulnerable to accidental misconfiguration and malicious attack. Although secure routing protocols are an important defense, the data plane must be part of any complete solution. Existing proposals for secure (link-level) forwarding are heavy-weight, requiring cryptographic operations at each hop in a path. Instead, we propose a light-weight data-plane mechanism (called stealth probing) that monitors the availability of paths in a secure fashion, while enabling the management plane to home in on the location of adversaries by combining the results of probes from different vantage points (called Byzantine tomography). We illustrate how stealth probing and Byzantine tomography can be applied in today's routing architecture, without requiring support from end hosts or internal routers.