An on-demand secure routing protocol resilient to byzantine failures
WiSE '02 Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Wireless security
Secure traceroute to detect faulty or malicious routing
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Using Conservation of Flow as a Security Mechanism in Network Protocols
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Detection of Denial-of-Message Attacks on Sensor Network Broadcasts
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Fatih: Detecting and Isolating Malicious Routers
DSN '05 Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
An Acknowledgment-Based Approach for the Detection of Routing Misbehavior in MANETs
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Stealth probing: efficient data-plane security for IP routing
ATEC '06 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX '06 Annual Technical Conference
Path-quality monitoring in the presence of adversaries
SIGMETRICS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Protocols and lower bounds for failure localization in the internet
EUROCRYPT'08 Proceedings of the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques 27th annual international conference on Advances in cryptology
Verifiable network-performance measurements
Proceedings of the 6th International COnference
Verifying and enforcing network paths with icing
Proceedings of the Seventh COnference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies
Improving availability in distributed systems with failure informers
nsdi'13 Proceedings of the 10th USENIX conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
Cross-layer metrics for reliable routing in wireless mesh networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Verifiable network function outsourcing: requirements, challenges, and roadmap
Proceedings of the 2013 workshop on Hot topics in middleboxes and network function virtualization
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Until recently, the design of packet dropping adversary identification protocols that are robust to both benign packet loss and malicious behavior has proven to be surprisingly elusive. In this paper, we propose a secure and practical packet-dropping adversary localization scheme that is robust and achieves a high detection rate and low communication and storage overhead -- the three key performance metrics for such protocols in realistic settings. Other recent work just optimizes either the detection rate or the communication overhead. In this paper, we systematically explore the design space of acknowledgment-based protocols to identify a packet dropping adversary on a forwarding path. In particular, we investigate a set of basic protocols, each exemplifying a design dimension, and examine the underlying tradeoff between the performance metrics. For each basic protocol, we present both upper and lower performance bounds via theoretical analysis, and average-case results via simulations. We conclude that the proposed PAAI-1 protocol outperforms other related schemes.