Theoretical bounds on control-plane self-monitoring in routing protocols
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Truth in advertising: lightweight verification of route integrity
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
ODSBR: An on-demand secure Byzantine resilient routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Packet-dropping adversary identification for data plane security
CoNEXT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference
Protocols and lower bounds for failure localization in the internet
EUROCRYPT'08 Proceedings of the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques 27th annual international conference on Advances in cryptology
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Network routers occupy a key role in modern data transport and consequently are attractive targets for attackers. By manipulating, diverting or dropping packets arriving at a compromised router, an attacker can trivially mount denial-of-service, surveillance or man-in-the-middle attacks on end host systems. In this paper, we specify the problem of detecting routers with incorrect packet forwarding behavior and we explore the design space of protocols that implement such a detector. We further present a concrete protocol that is inexpensive enough for practical implementation at scale.