Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
An analysis of BGP convergence properties
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Real-time protocol analysis for detecting link-state routing protocol attacks
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Design of fault tolerant distributed systems: the fail-controlled approach
EW 4 Proceedings of the 4th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 8th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Understanding BGP misconfiguration
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
An empirical study of router response to large BGP routing table load
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet measurment
Secure traceroute to detect faulty or malicious routing
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Measuring the effects of internet path faults on reactive routing
SIGMETRICS '03 Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Rushing attacks and defense in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols
WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Origin authentication in interdomain routing
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
SPV: secure path vector routing for securing BGP
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Brief announcement: strong detection of misconfigurations
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Reliable broadcast in unknown fixed-identity networks
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Fatih: Detecting and Isolating Malicious Routers
DSN '05 Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Implications of autonomy for the expressiveness of policy routing
Proceedings of the 2005 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Shrink: a tool for failure diagnosis in IP networks
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Mining network data
Listen and whisper: security mechanisms for BGP
NSDI'04 Proceedings of the 1st conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 1
Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Virtually eliminating router bugs
Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Emerging networking experiments and technologies
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The distributed routing protocols in use today promise to operate correctly only if all nodes implement the protocol faithfully. A small insignificant set of nodes have, in the past, brought an entire network to a standstill by reporting incorrect route information. The damage caused by these erroneous reports, in some instances, could have been contained since incorrect route reports sometimes reveal themselves as inconsistencies in the state-information of correctly functioning nodes. By checking for such inconsitencies and taking preventive action, such as disregarding selected route-reports, a correctly functioning node could have limited the damage caused by the malfunctioning nodes. Our theoretical study attempts to understand when a correctly functioning node can, by analysing its routing-state, detect that some node is misimplementing route selection. We present a methodology, called Strong-Detection that helps answer the question. We then apply Strong-Detection to three classes of routing protocols: distance-vector, path-vector, and link-state. For each class, we derive low-complexity self-monitoring algorithms that take as input the routing state and output whether any detectable anomalies exist. We then use these algorithms to compare and contrast the self-monitoring power ofthese different classes of protocols in relation to the complexity of the irrouting-state.