Hardness results on the man-exchange stable marriage problem with short preference lists

Authors:
Eric McDermid;Christine Cheng;Ichiro Suzuki
Affiliations:
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI;University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI;University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI
Venue:
Information Processing Letters
Year:
2007

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Abstract

We present two hardness results on the man-exchange stable marriage problem, one of which settles a recent conjecture of Irving on the complexity of determining whether a given instance of the stable marriage problem with short preference lists has a man-exchange stable matching.