Sequential Auctions for the Allocation of Resources with Complementarities
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Making Rational Decisions Using Adaptive Utility Elicitation
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
CIA '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents IV, The Future of Information Agents in Cyberspace
Preference elicitation via theory refinement
The Journal of Machine Learning Research
An agenda-based framework for multi-issue negotiation
Artificial Intelligence
Optimal Negotiation of Multiple Issues in Incomplete Information Settings
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Learning on opponent's preferences to make effective multi-issue negotiation trade-offs
ICEC '04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Electronic commerce
Predicting user preferences via similarity-based clustering
Canadian AI'08 Proceedings of the Canadian Society for computational studies of intelligence, 21st conference on Advances in artificial intelligence
The learning of an opponent's approximate preferences in bilateral automated negotiation
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research
Measuring the performance of online opponent models in automated bilateral negotiation
AI'12 Proceedings of the 25th Australasian joint conference on Advances in Artificial Intelligence
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We present a classification method for learning an opponent's preferences during a bilateral multi-issue negotiation. Similar candidate preference relations over the set of offers are grouped into classes, and a Bayesian technique is used to determine, for each class, the likelihood that the opponent's true preference relation lies in that class. Evidence used for classification decision-making is obtained by observing the opponent's sequence of offers, and applying the concession assumption, which states that negotiators usually decrease their offer utilities as time passes in order to find a deal. Simple experiments show that the technique can find the correct class after very few offers and can select a preference relation that is likely to match closely with the opponent's true preferences.