A localized certificate revocation scheme for mobile ad hoc networks

  • Authors:
  • Geneviève Arboit;Claude Crépeau;Carlton R. Davis;Muthucumaru Maheswaran

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Computer Science, McGill University, 3480 University Street, Montréal, Que., Canada H3A2A7;School of Computer Science, McGill University, 3480 University Street, Montréal, Que., Canada H3A2A7;School of Computer Science, McGill University, 3480 University Street, Montréal, Que., Canada H3A2A7;School of Computer Science, McGill University, 3480 University Street, Montréal, Que., Canada H3A2A7

  • Venue:
  • Ad Hoc Networks
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

The issue of certificate revocation in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) where there are no on-line access to trusted authorities, is a challenging problem. In wired network environments, when certificates are to be revoked, certificate authorities (CAs) add the information regarding the certificates in question to certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and post the CRLs on accessible repositories or distribute them to relevant entities. In purely ad hoc networks, there are typically no access to centralized repositories or trusted authorities; therefore the conventional method of certificate revocation is not applicable. In this paper, we present a decentralized certificate revocation scheme that allows the nodes within a MANET to revoke the certificates of malicious entities. The scheme is fully contained and it does not rely on inputs from centralized or external entities.