A certificate revocation scheme for space network

Authors:
Yanbin Qian;Binghua Cao;Xingyuan Chen;Xuehui Du
Affiliations:
Institute of Electronic Technology, the PLA Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China;Institute of Electronic Technology, the PLA Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China;Institute of Electronic Technology, the PLA Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China;Institute of Electronic Technology, the PLA Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China
Venue:
WiCOM'09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Wireless communications, networking and mobile computing
Year:
2009

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Abstract

The issue of certificate revocation is a challenging problem in space network, due to the reachability to security infrastructure such as CA is not assumed guaranteed. In this paper, we present a decentralized certificate revocation scheme that allows the nodes within a space network to revoke the certificates of malicious entities, depending on a local decision making, and immediately shield themselves and accuse the malicious nodes. Our scheme can be distinguished from previous proposals, in that it neither require time synchronization nor require global knowledge of the network, and can be supposed to resistant to adversarial attacks against this scheme. We also analyze quantitative the performance and security of our scheme, and show that our solution is feasible and achieves a sufficient level of robustness by means of simulations.