Operations Research
Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: networks of plausible inference
Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: networks of plausible inference
Probabilistic inference and influence diagrams
Operations Research
Valuation-based systems for Bayesian decision analysis
Operations Research
Proceedings of the eighth conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
UAI '92 Proceedings of the eighth conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Handbook of Computational Economics
Handbook of Computational Economics
ECSQARU '01 Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
UAI '00 Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Dynamic Programming
Representing and Solving Decision Problems with Limited Information
Management Science
Proceedings of the Fifteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
UAI'99 Proceedings of the Fifteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Proceedings of the Fourteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
UAI'98 Proceedings of the Fourteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Proceedings of the Tenth international conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
UAI'94 Proceedings of the Tenth international conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Decision Analysis
Supporting Negotiations over Influence Diagrams
Decision Analysis
From the Editors---Games and Decisions in Reliability and Risk
Decision Analysis
Solving limited memory influence diagrams
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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We consider the representation and evaluation of team decision making under uncertainty using influence diagrams. We assume that all team members agree on common beliefs and preferences, but complete sharing of information is generally impossible. As a result, the team can be represented as a single rational individual with imperfect recall, and the optimal solution with perfect recall might not be achievable, except in special cases we can recognize. An alternative solution concept is a stable solution that integrates the notion of optimality with that of equilibrium from game theory. We extend this concept from individual decisions to sets of decisions, and introduce the Strategy Improvement and its variation, Uniform Strategy Improvement, as the corresponding solution methods. We also provide a variety of simplifying transformations to the influence diagram by exploiting its graphical structure. The result is a requisite influence diagram, one that requires minimum assessment and creates additional opportunities for optimality.