From the Editor---Decisions over Time (Exploding Offers or Purchase Regret), in Game Settings (Embedded Nash Bargaining or Adversarial Games), and in Influence Diagrams

  • Authors:

  • L. Robin Keller

  • Affiliations:

  • The Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California 92697

  • Venue:
  • Decision Analysis
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Our first two articles address decisions involving the passage of time. First, Steven A. Lippman and John W. Mamer explore the question of whether making “Exploding Offers” is beneficial to an employer seeking to hire or, in a more general framing of the question, to a purchaser of an asset. Next, in “Dynamic Purchase Decisions Under Regret: Price and Availability,” Enrico Diecidue, Nils Rudi, and Wenjie Tang examine situations in which a person can make a forward purchase in period 1 or a spot purchase in period 2. Our next two articles involve game theoretic models. In our third article, Steven A. Lippman and Kevin F. McCardle model joint decision making (motivated by dividing up a fortune) via “Embedded Nash Bargaining: Risk Aversion and Impatience.” The fourth article is “Robust Adversarial Risk Analysis: A Level-k Approach,” by Laura McLay, Casey Rothschild, and Seth Guikema. The final article is on “A Framework for Solving Hybrid Influence Diagrams Containing Deterministic Conditional Distributions,” by Yijing Li and Prakash P. Shenoy.