Alternative essences of intelligence
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Theory of Mind for a Humanoid Robot
Autonomous Robots
Abnormal Processing of Social Information from Faces in Autism
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
Frontal Lobe Contributions to Theory of Mind
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
Reading the Windows to the Soul: Evidence of Domain-Specific Sparing in Williams Syndrome
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
Fear Recognition Ability Predicts Differences in Social Cognitive and Neural Functioning in Men
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
Computation for metaphors, analogy, and agents
Consciousness and the social mind
Cognitive Systems Research
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Many species can respond to the behavior of their conspecifics. Human children, and perhaps some nonhuman primates, also have the capacity to respond to the mental states of their conspecifics, i.e., they have a “theory of mind.” On the basis of previous research on the theory-of-mind impairment in people with autism, together with animal models of intentionality, Brothers and Ring (1992) postulated a broad cognitive module whose function is to build representations of other individuals. We evaluate the details of this hypothesis through a series of experiments on language, face processing, and theory of mind carried out with subjects with Williams syndrome, a rare genetic neurodevelopmental disorder resulting in an uneven lin-guisticocognitive profile. The results are discussed in terms of how the comparison of different phenotypes (e.g., Williams syndrome, Down syndrome, autism, and hydrocephaly with associated myelomeningocele) can contribute both to understanding the neuropsychology of social cognition and to current thinking about the purported modularity of the brain.