The Scyther Tool: Verification, Falsification, and Analysis of Security Protocols

  • Authors:
  • Cas J. Cremers

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland 8092

  • Venue:
  • CAV '08 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

With the rise of the Internet and other open networks, a large number of security protocols have been developed and deployed in order to provide secure communication. The analysis of such security protocols has turned out to be extremely difficult for humans, as witnessed by the fact that many protocols were found to be flawed after deployment. This has driven the research in formal analysis of security protocols. Unfortunately, there are no effective approaches yet for constructing correct and efficient protocols, and work on concise formal logics that might allow one to easily prove that a protocol is correct in a formal model, is still ongoing. The most effective approach so far has been automated falsification or verification of such protocols with state-of-the-art tools such as ProVerif [1] or the Avispa tools [2]. These tools have shown to be effective at finding attacks on protocols (Avispa) or establishing correctness of protocols (ProVerif).