Integrating security in a large distributed system
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Transparent process migration: design alternatives and the sprite implementation
Software—Practice & Experience
How to securely replicate services
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Compiler-assisted full checkpointing
Software—Practice & Experience
A security architecture for fault-tolerant systems
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS) - Special issue on computer architecture
A model, analysis, and protocol framework for soft state-based communication
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
Timestamps in key distribution protocols
Communications of the ACM
A unified approach to global program optimization
POPL '73 Proceedings of the 1st annual ACM SIGACT-SIGPLAN symposium on Principles of programming languages
Authentication tests and the structure of bundles
Theoretical Computer Science
Migratory TCP: Connection Migration for Service Continuity in the Internet
ICDCS '02 Proceedings of the 22 nd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'02)
A comparison of hard-state and soft-state signaling protocols
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Session state: beyond soft state
NSDI'04 Proceedings of the 1st conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 1
Fault-tolerant authentication services
International Journal of Computers and Applications
Programming cryptographic protocols
TGC'05 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Trustworthy global computing
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As cryptographic protocols execute they accumulate information such as values and keys, and evidence of properties about this information. As execution proceeds, new information becomes relevant while some old information ceases to be of use. Identifying what information is necessary at each point in a protocol run is valuable for both analysis and deployment. We formalize this necessary information as the minimal backup of a protocol. We present an analysis that determines the minimal backup at each point in a protocol run. We show that this minimal backup has many uses: it serves as a foundation for job-migration and other kinds of fault-tolerance, and also assists protocol designers understand the structure of protocols and identify potential flaws. In a cryptographic context it is dangerous to reason informally. We have therefore formalized and verified this work using the Coq proof assistant. Additionally, Coq provides a certified implementation of our analysis. Concretely, our analysis and its implementation consume protocols written in a variant of the Cryptographic Protocol Programming Language, CPPL.