Safe kernel extensions without run-time checking
OSDI '96 Proceedings of the second USENIX symposium on Operating systems design and implementation
CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Oracle-based checking of untrusted software
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Java Virtual Machine Specification
Java Virtual Machine Specification
Computer architecture: a quantitative approach
Computer architecture: a quantitative approach
The case for virtual register machines
Proceedings of the 2003 workshop on Interpreters, virtual machines and emulators
Foundational proof checkers with small witnesses
Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGPLAN international conference on Principles and practice of declaritive programming
Proof Optimization Using Lemma Extraction
Proof Optimization Using Lemma Extraction
Encoding the Program Correctness Proofs as Programs in PCC Technology
PST '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Sixth Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust
An extended proof-carrying code framework for security enforcement
Transactions on computational science XI
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
One of the key issues with the practical applicability of Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) and its related methods is the difficulty in communicating the proofs which are inherently large. One way to alleviate this problem is to transmit, instead, a proof generator for the program in question in a generic extended PCC framework (EPCC). The EPCC needs to provide the execution of the proof generator at the consumer side in a secure manner. The ability to securely run arbitrary untrusted proof generator is a challenging problem. We explore the design of a small and safe virtual machine (VEP) which provides the EPCC with a robust security guarantee. The VEP is a minor TCB extension of less than 300 lines of code which works as a safe execution environment and brings about a practical solution to thecommon security and resource management issues.