Attack-tolerant localization via iterative verification of locations in sensor networks

  • Authors:
  • Taejoon Park;Kang G. Shin

  • Affiliations:
  • Korea Aerospace University, Gyeonggi-do, Korea;University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI

  • Venue:
  • ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS)
  • Year:
  • 2009

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In sensor networks, secure localization—determining sensors' locations in a hostile, untrusted environment—is a challenging, but very important, problem that has not yet been addressed effectively. This paper presents an attack-tolerant localization protocol, called Verification for Iterative Localization (VeIL), under which sensors cooperatively safeguard the localization service. By exploiting the high spatiotemporal correlation existing between adjacent nodes, VeIL realizes (a) adaptive management of a profile for normal localization behavior, and (b) distributed detection of false locations advertised by attackers by comparing them against the profile of normal behavior. Our analysis and simulation results show that VeIL achieves high-level tolerance to many critical attacks, and is computationally feasible on resource-limited sensors.