Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Core: a collaborative reputation mechanism to enforce node cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/TC11 Sixth Joint Working Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security: Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security
Graphical Models for Game Theory
UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Cooperation Issues in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
ICDCSW '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops - W7: EC (ICDCSW'04) - Volume 7
Selfish MAC Layer Misbehavior in Wireless Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
A tight characterization of strategic games with a unique equlibrium
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
A tight characterization of strategic games with a unique equilibrium
Theoretical Computer Science
| Hi-index | 5.23 |
Media access protocols in wireless networks require each contending node to wait for a backoff time, chosen randomly from a fixed range, before attempting to transmit on a shared channel. However, nodes acting in their own selfish interest may not follow the protocol. In this paper, a static version of the problem is modeled as a strategic game played by non-cooperating, rational players (the nodes). The objective is to design a game which exhibits a unique, a priori mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. In the context of the media access problem, the equilibrium of the game would correspond to nodes choosing backoff times randomly from a given range of values, according to the given distribution. We consider natural variations of the problems concerning the number of actions available to the players and show that it is possible to design such a game when there are at least two players that each have the largest number of possible actions among all players. In contrast, we show that if there are exactly two players with different number of actions available to them, then it becomes impossible to design a strategic game with a unique such Nash equilibrium.