A Logic for Reasoning about Rational Agents

  • Authors:

  • Wojciech Jamroga;Nils Bulling

  • Affiliations:

  • Department of Informatics, Clausthal University of Technology, Germany;Department of Informatics, Clausthal University of Technology, Germany

  • Venue:
  • Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We have recently proposed an extension of alternating-time temporal logic for reasoning about behavior and abilities of agents under various rationality assumptions. The logic, called ATLP ("alternating-time temporal logic with plausibility") used abstract, unstructured terms for addressing rationality assumptions. Here, we propose a more complex language of terms that allows to specify sets of rational strategy profiles in the object language, building upon existing work on logical characterizations of game-theoretic solution concepts. In particular, we recall how the notions of Nash equilibrium, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, and Pareto optimality can be characterized with logical formulae and we show how these can be used within ATLP for reasoning about what rational agents should achieve. We also prove complexity results for model checking of ATLP formulae.