Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria
Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computing equilibria in multi-player games
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Computing sequential equilibria for two-player games
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Settling the Complexity of Two-Player Nash Equilibrium
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Fast algorithms for finding proper strategies in game trees
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Pure Nash equilibria: hard and easy games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Efficiently exploiting symmetries in real time dynamic programming
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium
STACS'07 Proceedings of the 24th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Strong and correlated strong equilibria in monotone congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the rate of convergence of fictitious play
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On the tradeoff between economic efficiency and strategy proofness in randomized social choice
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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This paper investigates the computational properties of quasi-strict equilibrium, an attractive equilibrium refinement proposed by Harsanyi, which was recently shown to always exist in bimatrix games. We prove that deciding the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium in games with more than two players is NP-complete. We further show that, in contrast to Nash equilibrium, the support of quasi-strict equilibrium in zero-sum games is unique and propose a linear program to compute quasi-strict equilibria in these games. Finally, we prove that every symmetric multi-player game where each player has two actions at his disposal contains an efficiently computable quasi-strict equilibrium which may itself be asymmetric.