Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria
Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria
Fast algorithms for finding randomized strategies in game trees
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Representations and solutions for game-theoretic problems
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Computing sequential equilibria for two-player games
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Settling the Complexity of Two-Player Nash Equilibrium
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Lossless abstraction of imperfect information games
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Approximating game-theoretic optimal strategies for full-scale poker
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Computing a proper equilibrium of a bimatrix game
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
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We show how to find a normal form proper equilibrium in behavior strategies of a given two-player zero-sum extensive form game with imperfect information but perfect recall. Our algorithm solves a finite sequence of linear programs and runs in polynomial time. For the case of a perfect information game, we show how to find a normal form proper equilibrium in linear time by a simple backwards induction procedure.