A Network Coloring Game

  • Authors:
  • Kamalika Chaudhuri;Fan Chung Graham;Mohammad Shoaib Jamall

  • Affiliations:
  • Information Theory and Applications Center, UC, San Diego,;Department of Mathematics, UC, San Diego,;Department of Mathematics, UC, San Diego,

  • Venue:
  • WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We analyze a network coloring game which was first proposed byMichael Kearns and others in their experimental study of dynamicsand behavior in social networks. In each round of the game, eachplayer, as a node in a network G, uses a simple, greedy and selfishstrategy by choosing randomly one of the available colors that isdifferent from all colors played by its neighbors in the previousround. We show that the coloring game converges to its Nashequilibrium if the number of colors is at least two more than themaximum degree. Examples are given for which convergence does nothappen with one fewer color. We also show that with probability atleast 1 − Δ, the number of roundsrequired is O(log(n/Δ)).