Modeling and performance analysis of BitTorrent-like peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
From Selfish Nodes to Cooperative Networks " Emergent Link-Based Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Networks
P2P '04 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
SLACER: A Self-Organizing Protocol for Coordination in Peer-to-Peer Networks
IEEE Intelligent Systems
On the topologies formed by selfish peers
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Algorithmic Game Theory
Change your tags fast! - a necessary condition for cooperation?
MABS'04 Proceedings of the 2004 international conference on Multi-Agent and Multi-Agent-Based Simulation
On cooperative and efficient overlay network evolution based on a group selection pattern
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics
On cooperative and efficient overlay network evolution based on a group selection pattern
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics - Special issue on game theory
Federation Lifecycle Management Incorporating Coordination of Bio-inspired Self-management Processes
Journal of Network and Systems Management
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In overlay networks, interplay between network structure and dynamics remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we study dynamic co-evolution between individual strategies (cooperative or defect) and overlay network structures. Inspired by evolutionary game theory, we propose a general scheme to evolve a given overlay into the resulting topology, which has high global network efficiency and average clustering coefficient that indicate high small-world-ness. In our scheme, peers' local interactions integrate network reciprocity and group selection algorithm, and lead to the emergence of cooperative and efficient overlay network structure. Specifically, we design a link-formation game to characterize the social dilemma of forming links in overlay network, which means that, in this game, defection always gives individual peers a higher payoff regardless of what opponent's strategy is, but, the aggregation of payoffs by mutual cooperative peers is always better than all other cases. In its evolutionary link formation phase, we adopt simple economic process-each peer keeps one link to cooperative neighbor in its neighborhood. Our simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can drive a given overlay network into fully cooperative and efficient small-world structure.