Small worlds: the dynamics of networks between order and randomness
Small worlds: the dynamics of networks between order and randomness
Modeling and performance analysis of BitTorrent-like peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
From Selfish Nodes to Cooperative Networks " Emergent Link-Based Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Networks
P2P '04 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Gossip-based aggregation in large dynamic networks
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
SLACER: A Self-Organizing Protocol for Coordination in Peer-to-Peer Networks
IEEE Intelligent Systems
On the topologies formed by selfish peers
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Algorithmic Game Theory
CHINAGRID '08 Proceedings of the The Third ChinaGrid Annual Conference (chinagrid 2008)
On Evolution of Cooperative Overlay Network Based on Group Selection Mechanism
ICYCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 The 9th International Conference for Young Computer Scientists
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Bio-Inspired Models of Network, Information and Computing Sytems
Change your tags fast! - a necessary condition for cooperation?
MABS'04 Proceedings of the 2004 international conference on Multi-Agent and Multi-Agent-Based Simulation
A simple public-goods game based incentive mechanism for resource provision in P2P networks
UIC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Ubiquitous intelligence and computing
P2P soft security: On evolutionary dynamics of P2P incentive mechanism
Computer Communications
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Incentive mechanism for selfish nodes in wireless sensor networks based on evolutionary game
Computers & Mathematics with Applications
On modeling of coevolution of strategies and structure in autonomous overlay networks
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS)
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS)
Sharing hardware resources in heterogeneous computer-supported collaboration scenarios
Integrated Computer-Aided Engineering
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In overlay networks, the interplay between network structure and dynamics remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we study dynamic coevolution between individual rational strategies (cooperative or defect) and the overlay network structure, that is, the interaction between peer's local rational behaviors and the emergence of the whole network structure. We propose an evolutionary game theory (EGT)-based overlay topology evolution scheme to drive a given overlay into the small-world structure (high global network efficiency and average clustering coefficient). Our contributions are the following threefold: From the viewpoint of peers' local interactions, we explicitly consider the peer's rational behavior and introduce a link-formation game to characterize the social dilemma of forming links in an overlay network. Furthermore, in the evolutionary link-formation phase, we adopt a simple economic process: Each peer keeps one link to a cooperative neighbor in its neighborhood, which can slightly speed up the convergence of cooperation and increase network efficiency; from the viewpoint of the whole network structure, our simulation results show that the EGT-based scheme can drive an arbitrary overlay network into a fully cooperative and efficient small-world structure. Moreover, we compare our scheme with a search-based economic model of network formation and illustrate that our scheme can achieve the experimental and analytical results in the latter model. In addition, we also graphically illustrate the final overlay network structure; finally, based on the group selection model and evolutionary set theory, we theoretically obtain the approximate threshold of cost and draw the conclusion that the small value of the average degree and the large number of the total peers in an overlay network facilitate the evolution of cooperation.