Information rules: a strategic guide to the network economy
Information rules: a strategic guide to the network economy
Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks
WELCOM '01 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce
Coordinating Channels Under Price and Nonprice Competition
Marketing Science
Channel Dynamics Under Price and Service Competition
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Managing Digital Piracy: Pricing and Protection
Information Systems Research
Prototyping a novel platform for free-trade of digital content
WebMedia '06 Proceedings of the 12th Brazilian Symposium on Multimedia and the web
Information Systems Research
Economic Implications of Variable Technology Standards for Movie Piracy in a Global Context
Journal of Management Information Systems
Modeling viral economies for digital media
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2008
Off-line economies for digital media
Proceedings of the 2006 international workshop on Network and operating systems support for digital audio and video
P2P commercial digital content exchange
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
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Although the online business-to-consumer (B2C) channel is the primary selling channel for digital content (e.g., videos, images, and music), modern digital technology has made possible the legal dissemination of such content over the consumer-to-consumer (C2C) channel through personal computing devices, such as PCs, mobile phones, and portable media players. This paper investigates the optimal channel structure and the corresponding pricing and service strategies for digital content distribution in order to understand the business value of introducing the C2C channel alongside the prevailing B2C channel. We identify conditions under which it is more profitable to use both B2C and C2C channels simultaneously (i.e., the dual-channel distribution). In such cases, the seller performs price discrimination among consumers but provides them with a higher level of service. Our analysis further characterizes the benefits of service provision. We show that service provision can increase the dual-channel pricing flexibility, reduce the seller's B2C channel dependence, and allow the seller to tolerate higher C2C channel redistribution costs. Finally, in examining the effect of a competitively determined B2C channel price on optimal channel strategy, we find that the seller prefers a dual-channel distribution under higher B2C channel prices.