Leveraging complexity in software for cybersecurity

Authors:
Robert C. Armstrong;Jackson R. Mayo
Affiliations:
Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, California;Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, California
Venue:
Proceedings of the 5th Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research: Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Challenges and Strategies
Year:
2009

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Abstract

A method for assessing statistically quantifiable improvements in security for software vulnerabilities is presented. Drawing on concepts in complexity theory, undecidability, and previous work in high-reliability systems, we show that ensembles of similar implementations have statistical value even though each by itself is inscrutable. Research questions are identified that may allow practical application of these concepts.