The power of sequential single-item auctions for agent coordination

  • Authors:

  • S. Koenig;C. Tovey;M. Lagoudakis;V. Markakis;D. Kempe;P. Keskinocak;A. Kleywegt;A. Meyerson;S. Jain

  • Affiliations:

  • University of Southern California, Computer Science Department, Los Angeles;Georgia Institute of Technology, School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Atlanta;Technical University of Crete, Department of Electronic and Computer Engineering, Chania, Greece;University of Toronto, Department of Computer Science, Toronto, Canada;University of Southern California, Computer Science Department, Los Angeles;Georgia Institute of Technology, School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Atlanta;Georgia Institute of Technology, School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Atlanta;University of California at Los Angeles, Computer Science Department, Los Angeles;Microsoft, US-Windows Client Platform, Redmond

  • Venue:
  • AAAI'06 proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

Teams of robots are more fault tolerant than single robots, and auctions appear to be promising means for coordinating them. In a recent paper at "Robotics: Science and Systems 2005," we analyzed a coordination system based on sequential single-item auctions. We showed that the coordination system is simple to implement and computation and communication efficient, and that the resulting sum of all travel distances in known terrain is guaranteed to be only a constant factor away from optimum. In this paper, we put these results in perspective by comparing our coordination system against those based on either parallel single-item auction, or combinatorial auctions, demonstrating that it combines the advantages of both.