Artificial intelligence: a modern approach
Artificial intelligence: a modern approach
Chaff: engineering an efficient SAT solver
Proceedings of the 38th annual Design Automation Conference
Knowlege in action: logical foundations for specifying and implementing dynamical systems
Knowlege in action: logical foundations for specifying and implementing dynamical systems
Computer-aided proofs of Arrow's and other impossibility theorems
Artificial Intelligence
On the logic of preference and judgment aggregation
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Discovering theorems in game theory: Two-person games with unique pure Nash equilibrium payoffs
Artificial Intelligence
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Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is one of the landmark results in social choice theory. Over the years since the theorem was proved in 1950, quite a few alternative proofs have been put forward. In this paper, we propose yet another alternative proof of the theorem. The basic idea is to use induction to reduce the theorem to the base case with 3 alternatives and 2 agents and then use computers to verify the base case. This turns out to be an effective approach for proving other impossibility theorems such as Sen's and Muller-Satterthwaite's theorems as well. Furthermore, we believe this new proof opens an exciting prospect of using computers to discover similar impossibility or even possibility results.