Discrete Mathematics - First Japan Conference on Graph Theory and Applications
The Computer-Aided Discovery of Scientific Knowledge
DS '98 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Discovery Science
Computer-aided proofs of Arrow's and other impossibility theorems
Artificial Intelligence
Methods for boosting revenue in combinatorial auctions
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Approximating revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Computer-aided proofs of arrow's and other impossibility theorems
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Discovering classes of strongly equivalent logic programs
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Automated theory formation in mathematics
IJCAI'77 Proceedings of the 5th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Automated search for impossibility theorems in social choice theory: ranking sets of objects
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Computer-aided theorem discovery---a new adventure and its application to economic theory
Computer-aided theorem discovery---a new adventure and its application to economic theory
Abstract argumentation via monadic second order logic
SUM'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Scalable Uncertainty Management
A qualitative comparison of the suitability of four theorem provers for basic auction theory
CICM'13 Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Intelligent Computer Mathematics
The ForMaRE project: formal mathematical reasoning in economics
CICM'13 Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Intelligent Computer Mathematics
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In this paper we provide a logical framework for two-person finite games in strategic form, and use it to design a computer program for discovering some classes of games that have unique pure Nash equilibrium payoffs. The classes of games that we consider are those that can be expressed by a conjunction of two binary clauses, and our program re-discovered Kats and Thisse@?s class of weakly unilaterally competitive two-person games, and came up with several other classes of games that have unique pure Nash equilibrium payoffs. It also came up with new classes of strict games that have unique pure Nash equilibria, where a game is strict if for both player different profiles have different payoffs.