Dynamics of IP traffic: a study of the role of variability and the impact of control
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Network simulations with OPNET
Proceedings of the 31st conference on Winter simulation: Simulation---a bridge to the future - Volume 1
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Advances in Network Simulation
Computer
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy
International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems
Simulating realistic network worm traffic for worm warning system design and testing
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Rapid malcode
Simulation of large scale networks I: simulation of large-scale networks using SSF
Proceedings of the 35th conference on Winter simulation: driving innovation
RINSE: The Real-Time Immersive Network Simulation Environment for Network Security Exercises
Proceedings of the 19th Workshop on Principles of Advanced and Distributed Simulation
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Large scale simulation of Tor: modelling a global passive adversary
ASIAN'07 Proceedings of the 12th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: computer and network security
On flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix networks
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Timing analysis in low-latency mix networks: attacks and defenses
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Privacy vulnerabilities in encrypted HTTP streams
PET'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
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Measuring the effectiveness of proposed black box correlation attacks against deployed anonymous networks is not feasible. This results in not being able to measure the effectiveness of defensive techniques, or performance enhancements with respect to anonymity. To overcome this problem, a discrete, event-based network simulation of the Tor anonymous network is developed. The simulation is validated against traffic transmitted through the real Tor network and the scalability of the simulation is measured. Simulations with up to 16,000 clients were run, upon which several attacks are implemented thus allowing for a measure of anonymity. Experimental defensive techniques are tested with corresponding anonymity measured.