Introducing hierarchy in energy games

  • Authors:
  • S. Lasaulce;Y. Hayel;R. El Azouzi;M. Debbah

  • Affiliations:
  • Laboratoire des Signaux et Systemes, Supelec, Gif-sur-Yvette, France;Lab. Informatique d’Avignon, Universite d’Avignon, Avignon, France;Lab. Informatique d’Avignon, Universite d’Avignon, Avignon, France;Supelec, Gif-sur-Yvette Cedex, France

  • Venue:
  • IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

In this work, we introduce hierarchy in wireless networks that can be modeled by a decentralized multiple access channel and for which energy-efficiency is the main performance index. In these networks users are free to choose their power control strategy to selfishly maximize their energy-efficiency. Specifically, we introduce hierarchy in two different ways: 1. Assuming single-user decoding at the receiver, we investigate a Stackelberg formulation of the game where one user is the leader whereas the other users are assumed to be able to react to the leader's decisions; 2. Assuming neither leader nor followers among the users, we introduce hierarchy by assuming successive interference cancellation at the receiver. It is shown that introducing a certain degree of hierarchy in non-cooperative power control games not only improves the individual energy efficiency of all the users but can also be a way of insuring the existence of a non-saturated equilibrium and reaching a desired trade-off between the global network performance at the equilibrium and the requested amount of signaling. In this respect, the way of measuring the global performance of an energy-efficient network is shown to be a critical issue.