Deceiving in GOLEM: how to strategically pilfer help
Trust and deception in virtual societies
Formal Analysis of Models for the Dynamics of Trust Based on Experiences
MAAMAW '99 Proceedings of the 9th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World: MultiAgent System Engineering
Trust and Deception in Mediated Communication
HICSS '03 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'03) - Track1 - Volume 1
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Modeling culture in trade: uncertainty avoidance
Proceedings of the 2008 Spring simulation multiconference
Individualism and Collectivism in Trade Agents
IEA/AIE '08 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Industrial, Engineering and Other Applications of Applied Intelligent Systems: New Frontiers in Applied Artificial Intelligence
Modeling Power Distance in Trade
Multi-Agent-Based Simulation IX
Modelling trade and trust across cultures
iTrust'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Trust Management
Trustworthy organic computing systems: challenges and perspectives
ATC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Autonomic and trusted computing
Computational modeling of culture's consequences
MABS'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Multi-agent-based simulation
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Trust is a sine qua non for trade. According to transaction cost economics, a contract always offers some opportunity to defect. In the case of asymmetric product information, where the seller is better informed about product quality than the buyer is, the buyer either has to rely on information provided by the seller or has to check the information by testing the product or tracing the supply chain processes, thus incurring extra transaction cost. An opportunistic seller who assumes the buyer to trust, may deliver a lower quality product than agreed upon. In human decisions to deceive and to show trust or distrust toward business partners, issues like morality, shame, self-esteem, and reputation are involved. These factors depend strongly on trader's cultural background. This paper develops an agent model of deceit and trust and describes a multi-agent simulation where trading agents are differentiated according to Hofstede's dimensions of national culture.