Security Analysis of a Probabilistic Non-repudiation Protocol
PAPM-PROBMIV '02 Proceedings of the Second Joint International Workshop on Process Algebra and Probabilistic Methods, Performance Modeling and Verification
Observations on Non-repudiation
ASIACRYPT '96 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
A Game-Based Verification of Non-repudiation and Fair Exchange Protocols
CONCUR '01 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Automatic Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
On Quantitative Analysis of Probabilistic Protocols
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
PRISM: a tool for automatic verification of probabilistic systems
TACAS'06 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
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In the probabilistic non-repudiation protocol without a trusted third party as presented in [5], the recipient of a service can cheat the originator of the service with some probability. This probability indicates the degree of fairness of the protocol and is referred as *** -fairness. In this paper, we analyze the protocol quantitatively through probabilistic model checking. The *** -fairness is quantitatively measured by modeling the protocol in PRISM model checker and verifying appropriate property specified in PCTL. Moreover, our analysis gives proper insight to choose proper values for different parameters associated with the protocol in such a way that certain degree of fairness can be achieved and therefore answers the reverse question, given the degree of fairness *** , how should one choose the protocol parameters to ensure fairness.