On Quantitative Analysis of Probabilistic Protocols

  • Authors:
  • Alessandro Aldini;Alessandra Di Pierro

  • Affiliations:
  • Istituto STI, Università Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy;Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di Pisa, Italy

  • Venue:
  • Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

We advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilistic protocols. Our approach relies on a formalisation of the protocol in the setting of a probabilistic process algebra and a notion of process similarity based on weak probabilistic bisimulation. We illustrate this approach by presenting the analysis of a probabilistic nonrepudiation protocol which allows us to quantitatively estimate its fairness degree.