Security Analysis of a Probabilistic Non-repudiation Protocol

Authors:
Alessandro Aldini;Roberto Gorrieri
Affiliations:
-;-
Venue:
PAPM-PROBMIV '02 Proceedings of the Second Joint International Workshop on Process Algebra and Probabilistic Methods, Performance Modeling and Verification
Year:
2002

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Abstract

Non-interference is a definition of security introduced for the analysis of confidential information flow in computer systems. In this paper, a probabilistic notion of non-interference is used to reveal information leakage which derives from the probabilistic behavior of systems. In particular, as a case study, we model and analyze a nonrepudiation protocol which employs a probabilistic algorithm to achieve a fairness property. The analysis, conducted by resorting to a definition of probabilistic non-interference in the context of process algebras, confirms that a solely nondeterministic approach to the information flow theory is not enough to study the security guarantees of cryptographic protocols.