On the Power of Two-Party Quantum Cryptography

  • Authors:
  • Louis Salvail;Christian Schaffner;Miroslava Sotáková

  • Affiliations:
  • Université de Montréal (DIRO), Canada;Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI), Amsterdam, The Netherlands;Dept. of Computer Science, SUNY Stony Brook, USA

  • Venue:
  • ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2009

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. Under the sole assumption of correctness--guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes--we show that every protocol implementing a non-trivial primitive necessarily leaks information to a dishonest player. This extends known impossibility results to all non-trivial primitives. We provide a framework for quantifying this leakage and argue that leakage is a good measure for the privacy provided to the players by a given protocol. Our framework also covers the case where the two players are helped by a trusted third party. We show that despite the help of a trusted third party, the players cannot amplify the cryptographic power of any primitive. All our results hold even against quantum honest-but-curious adversaries who honestly follow the protocol but purify their actions and apply a different measurement at the end of the protocol. As concrete examples, we establish lower bounds on the leakage of standard universal two-party primitives such as oblivious transfer.